We are sentient beings, and we are sapient beings – we feel, and we think. Sapience is conceptual awareness – a kind of mindedness that is tied to understanding rather than sensing The contrasting autonomy idea is that we, as subjects, are genuinely normatively constrained only by rules we constrain ourselves by. . . . Merely natural creatures, as objects, are bound only by rules in the form of laws whose bindingness isn to all conditioned by attitudes of acknowledging those rules as binding them.
— Robert Brandom, Reason in Philosophy
Who am I? Who am I? I am Jean Valjean!
— Jean Valjean, Les Miserables
That something like this has occurred with the advance of civilization is a familiar fact. Even persons, it is said (mistakenly, I believe), are being 'depersonalized' by the advance of the scientific point of view.
Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”
In the first part of this series, I discussed the initial section of Sellars’ “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” (PSIM), “The Philosophical Quest.”1 We considered Sellar’s meta-philosophy and how it raises the question of the possibility of holding what he calls the manifest image of man and the scientific image of man in a stereoscopic or synoptic vision of the whole. For Sellars, any distinctively human activity is marked by a reflective knowing-ones-way-around. That is, the human, when acting as a human, doesn’t just know how to do what she is doing, but can self-consciously give reasons as to why her doing so is up to par regarding some norm governing such activities. In short, for Sellars, the mark of a distinctively human activity is that its agent enters into the logical space of reasons in her understanding of that activity. Among our human activities are our discourses of sense-making, i.e., our arts and sciences. Thus, the practitioner of a specialized science, say chemistry, enters into a logical space of reasons regarding the claims of chemistry, i.e., the chemist can reflectively give reasons for her assertions regarding chemical truths. Moreover, being in the space of reasons with respect to a specialized science like chemistry requires that one can be reflective not just within chemistry but also about chemistry. The fully reflective chemist asks “Why are these methods and presuppositions for doing chemistry the right methods and presuppositions for doing chemistry?” and “How does chemistry relate to biology, carpentry, and Victorian literature?” Notice, however, that as the chemist takes up these questions she moves from the distinctively chemical take on things and adopts a perspective that is not altogether different from the stance the reflective biologist, carpenter, or literary critic takes when asking the same sorts of questions (though beginning in the confines of their own local disciplines). At the ideal limit, there will be a discipline that operates in The Logical Space of Reasons, encompassing the whole of the diverse logical spaces of reasons for the specialized disciplines. This discipline is not only ideal in scope, but in reflectivity, i.e., it places its norms of reason under question. Sellars calls this ideally universal and self-critical discipline philosophy.
For Sellars, the philosophical quest is not only the ordering of the various special disciplines into a coherent whole, i.e., relating chemistry, biology, carpentry, and literary criticism into a sensible system. Rather, philosophy, like all truly humane practices, must first put its own fundamental presuppositions into question. The specially philosophical version of critical self-reflection entails wondering whether there really is an overall, unifying stance across the disciplines to be taken.2 Is there a whole over which we can have a perspective? This question is problematic, as Sellars believes that we are faced with two distinct, though putatively complete, visions or images of man-in-world, both vying for the status as the ordering principle of the whole: the manifest image of man and the scientific image of man. Whether this tension can be resolved such that the two images are brought together into a synoptic vision (or whether one can be collapsed in favor of the other) is, for Sellars, the primary philosophical question. Moreover, if Sellars is correct about the role of critical reflection in human activity, then our answer to this question is gravely important to our understanding of ourselves as having a distinctively human standing.
In the aptly named section of PSIM, “The Manifest Image,” Sellars begins to articulate what it would take to answer this first among philosophical questions by explicating the manifest image of man. He claims that the manifest image can be characterized in two complementary ways. The first of these characterizations of the manifest image is
the framework in terms of which man came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world. It is the framework in terms of which, to use an existentialist turn of phrase, man first encountered himself — which is of course, when he came to be man. For it is no merely incidental feature of man that he has a conception of himself as man-in the-world, just as it is obvious, on reflection, that ‘if man had a radically different conception of himself he would be radically different kind of man.’ (PSIM, p, 6)
Understood in this way, the manifest image is then simultaneously the mode in which humanity encounters itself as human and constitutes itself as human. In other words, we discover ourselves as distinctively human beings and achieve our human distinctiveness by framing ourselves according to the manifest image. Sellars’ point, and here he is basically taking over one of the core insights from German Idealism, is that we are the kind of beings that are capable of conceiving themselves in a certain way, and we thereby constitute ourselves (actualize our nature) as such by our self-conscious acts of self-conception. Human beings are the beings that have a stance toward themselves, and we reveal ourselves as such through our acts of taking self-defining stances. Markus Gabriel makes this point well:
what it is to be a minded (geistig) animal is to conceive of oneself in such a variety of ways. Human beings essentially respond to the question of what it means for them to be at the center of their own lives in different ways. What does not vary is the capacity, nay, the necessity, to respond differently to the question. Our response to the question of what it means to be a human minded animal is part of what shapes what it is to be such an animal. We turn ourselves into the creatures we are in each case by developing a mentalistic vocabulary. (Gabriel, I Am Not a Brain, pp. 3-4)
That is, we actualize ourselves as distinctively human by having a take on what it is to be distinctively human. The manifest image is the vision of ourselves according to which we are capable of such a self-referential take, i.e., it is the stance toward yourself according to which you are capable of having a stance toward yourself. Having a stance toward or a take on yourself is a reflective activity, so conceiving yourself according to an image of yourself as doing so is then constitutive of such a stance. In other words, viewing ourselves through the lens of the manifest image is thereby both our discovery of ourselves as distinctively human and constitutive of our distinctive humanity. In the manifest image we take ourselves as thinkers about our own thinking, and in taking such a stance we constitute ourselves as beings who think about our thinking.
There are, of course, oddities about this, basically Hegelian, framing of the manifest image (and human standing). First, there is an obvious circularity in play here, i.e., we constitute ourselves by encountering ourselves, but it would seem we would have to be constituted prior to be being encountered. Notice that this circularity mimics the very circularity of the philosophical exercise as Sellers presents it, i.e., the philosopher puts her philosophical presuppositions into question (mainly the notion that there is a whole into which all partial discourses can be integrated), but in doing so she performs a philosophical act seemingly based on those presuppositions. Second, I am sure many readers will be alarmed over the apparent risk of radical subjectivism lurking behind these remarks: “Is Sellars saying that humans, as distinctively human, can declare themselves to be whatever it is they deem themselves to be? Does Sellars think a human can declare himself to be a chicken?!” Certainly not, but to see why, we need to follow Sellars’ treatment of the former worry:
I want to highlight from the very beginning what might be called the paradox of man’s encounter with himself, the paradox consisting of the fact that man couldn’t be man until he encountered himself. It is the paradox which supports the last stand of Special Creation. Its central them is the idea that anything which can be properly called conceptual thinking can occur only within a framework of conceptual thinking in terms of which it an be criticized, supported, refuted, in short, evaluated. To be able to think is to be able to measure one’s thoughts by standards of correctness, of relevance, of evidence. In this sense a diversified conceptual framework is a whole which, however, sketchy, is prior to its parts, and cannot be construed as coming together of parts which are already conceptual in character. (PSIM, p. 6)
Sellars is not out to alleviate this circular paradox, and he immediately associates it with another paradox, which he likewise leaves unresolved i.e., any case of conceptual thinking presupposes a battery or network of concepts and conceptual relations, so it then seems impossible to get thinking off the ground by any natural, incremental process. For Sellars, thinking is implicitly reasons-giving, i.e., to think that X is implicitly to see that X is implied by Y and X implies Z, etc. If someone were to claim to understand a concept while lacking any sense of its inferential relations (its place in a network of reasons), then we would doubt that she really knows what she’s talking about. Thus, thinking is always done in a framework of actual and possible thoughts. If that is the case, then how a first thought gets off the ground is quite opaque, as there would need to be a prior backdrop of conceptual relations already in place; every explicit thought entails indefinitely many implicit thoughts. Attempts to make sense of thinking then seem doomed to circularity.3 By saying that this paradox constitutes the “last stand of Special Creation,” Sellars grants that exactly how a natural explanation could be given for the initial occurrence of thinking is quite puzzling. As he puts it, “The conclusion is difficult to avoid that the transition form pre-conceptual patterns of behavior to conceptual thinking was a holistic one, a jump to a level of awareness which is irreducibley new, a jump which was the coming into being of man” (PSIM, p. 6). Notice too that how one thinks of this jump is integral to the very difference between the manifest and the scientific images of man: “For . . . this difference in level appears as an irreducible discontinuity in the manifest image, but as, in a sense requiring careful analysis, a reducible difference in the scientific image” (PSIM, p. 6; Sellars’ emphasis). In other words, when looked at through the lens of the manifest image, something like “Special Creation” is necessary to account for the leap from the non-conceptual to the conceptual, whereas the view form the scientific image recognizes no need for anything special. More on this issue later!
Fascinatingly, Sellars has revealed a circular pattern that introduces itself at three crucial points: the circularity of the the philosophical quest (philosophy must justify its perspective by taking its perspective), the circularity of humanity’s self-encounter through the manifest image (humanity’s encounter with itself constitutes humanity), and the circularity of any accounting for the origins of thinking (a single act of thinking presupposes myriad other ready to hand acts of thinking). Notice too that each of these paradoxes is intimately related to the philosophy of mind. Philosophy is the ideal limit of thinking about thinking, a questioning of whether any ultimate sense can be made of all of our modes of thinking; we encounter ourselves in the manifest images inasmuch as we think about our thinking; and our attempts to think about the origins of our thinking presupposes our standing as thinkers. All of that is to say that the philosophy of mind (thinking about thinking) plays an integral role in our philosophical understanding of ourselves and our distinctive standing as philosophical creatures. Moreover, the project of philosophy of mind, though it demands our attention, seems to be something that is inherently open-ended, and one wonders whether this seeming circular opacity of the question of thinking about thinking is a non-negligible insight into to how Sellars’ ultimate philosophical question can be answered.4
We can now also see that Sellars has given us a considerable clue as to what it means to have a stance toward oneself according to the manifest image. In short, the manifest image is the self-referential stance that puts our self-conception (as a CONCEPTion) into the logical space of reasons. That is, the person who views herself through the lens of the manifest image sees herself as a person, i.e., someone who can give reasons for her stance toward herself. Our sense of ourselves as denizens in the space of reasons is to see ourselves as obligated to justify (to give evidence for, to show the relevance of, to demonstrate, to understand the implications of, etc.) our self-definitions. Thus, Sellars’ view is not a suggestion of a radical subjectivism, as a human self-declaration is essentially a kind of responsibility-taking. A human defines him or herself by taking responsibility for his or her self-understanding with respect to the norms of the space of reasons. On this view, we are not merely passive with respect to our self-conceptions (they are not what we just so happen to feel about ourselves). Rather, we are active in the construction of our self-conceptions inasmuch as we can justify ourselves according to the standards of the space of reasons. This transition from passivity is to activity is the mark of distinctive humanity, and whether we think of this movement in terms of a sui generis leap or an intelligible development is part of what is at stake in the tension between the manifest and the scientific images.5
Sellars began by promising two characterizations of the manifest image, and I have belabored (because I believe it reveals much about Sellars’ overall philosophical stance) the characterization as “the manifest image of man-in-the-world as the framework in terms of which man encountered himself” (PSIM, p. 6). Sellars is very eager to point out, however, that he is not arguing that the manifest image is a pre-scientific image or merely naive notion, and he thus goes on to characterize the manifest image as, “in an appropriate sense, itself a scientific image” (PSIM, p, 7). In this respect the manifest image is an empirical and categorical refinement over what Sellars calls the “original image.” The manifest image is a an empirical refinement over the original image (which we will discuss in moment) inasmuch as “it makes use of those aspects of the scientific method which might be lumped together under the heading ‘correlational induction’” (PSIM, p, 7). The manifest image involves a fine-grained (or at least finer-grained in comparison to the original image) correlational account of the association between reason-giving behavior and certain animate objects. That is, the manifest image uses methods of inductive correlation to develop a more rigorous and limited application “person” (or whatever its primordial synonyms may have been) than its previously promiscuous usage in the original image. The manifest image is the initial theory of personhood, where “original” is meant both diachronically (it is first in our shared history of thinking) and synchronically (it is first in terms of what his most phenomenologically salient to us as self-conscious persons). It is the product of the most direct and empirically immediate way of thinking about thinking.
We need, however, to be very cautious with talk of “theory” in this context, and this point is crucial for grasping Sellars’ project in PSIM. The manifest image is a correlational, not a postulationional theory of persons. Our original philosopher of mind (which is our original phenomenological self’s attempt to make sense of itself) is simply noting a correlation between person-like behavior (reason-giving and reason-demanding speech), and certain animate objects (human beings). The original philosophy of mind does not include “the postulation of imperceptible entities, and principles pertaining to them, to explain the behaviour of perceptible things” (PSIM, p. 7). Let’s call the original philosopher of mind “Jones.”6 Jone’s begins with the empirical discovery that personal behavior is exclusively correlated with human beings involved in certain speech acts (explicit participation in the language game of asking for and offering reasons for acting). At this juncture, Jones does not speculate as to what might be going on behind the scenes of these speech acts that might explain the correlation. Jones' scientific accounting is empirical, phenomenological, and (as we shall see) categorical, but it neither ontological nor reductive. The view through the manifest image does not attempt to account for the exclusive correlation between person-behavior (operating in the space of reasons) and humans by postulating any kind of unseen entity, whether that be a neurophysiological process or a the activity of an immaterial soul. For Sellars, Jones does not begin by introspection, but by noticing the correlation between other humans’ speech behavior and the space reasons. He only later learns to apply this result to himself as part of a theoretical extension. The crucial point here is that the manifest image, supposing Sellars is right about all this, has an explanatory autonomy of its own, regardless of whatever further postulational-explanatory account might later be given from within in the scientific image.7 This explanatory autonomy with respect to the the scientific image is the key methodological difference between the two competing images of man-in-the-world: “And, indeed, what I have referred to as the ‘scientific’ image of man-in-the-world and contrasted with the ‘manifest’ image, might be called the ‘postulational’ or ‘theoretical’ image” (PSIM, p. 7).
In this light, we should then see dualists, reductive materialists, panpsychists, certain breeds of hylomorphist (Thomists) as strange bedfellows, living under the big tent of the the scientific image. All such views attempt to account for the correlation between humans and persons highlighted by the manifest image (Jone’s theory) by positing unseen theoretical entities. I would put the self-avowed “Qualia Freaks” (Chalmers, Jackson, Nagel) into this same camp, as I am apt to think of qualia as theoretical and not observational/phenomenological entities. We can contrast those sorts of philosophers of mind with phenomenological thinkers such as the later Husserl, the early Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, the later Wittgenstein, and certain breeds of hylomorphist (Plato? Aristotle?) who operate exclusively in the manifest image (or what is often called the Lebenswelt), and who, in some cases, are dismissive of attempts to postulate any deeper explanation. The important divide is then not between the competing ontologies of the materialists and dualists, but between those who observe an irreducible autonomy of the manifest image, and those who believe it begs for a grounding in onto-explanatory theory.8 Of course, there is also the Sellarsian-Platonic hope that the two visions can be held synoptically.
Does Jones really explain anything? In what sense can his correlational account of persons amount to a theory, as opposed to an uninterpreted observation?9 To answer these questions, we need to address the second refinement of the manifest image over the original image — Jones is a categorical innovator. Consider the following remarks from Sellars:
The first point I wish to make is that there is an important sense in which the primary objects of the manifest image are persons. And to understand how this is so, is to understand central and, indeed crucial themes in the history of philosophy. Perhaps the best way to make the point is to refer back to the construct which we called the 'original' image of man-in-the-world, and characterize it as a framework in which all the 'objects' are persons. From this point of view the refinement of the 'original' image into the manifest image, is the gradual depersonalization' of objects other than persons. (PSIM, pp. 9-10; Sellars’ emphasis)
The original image is a sort of animism according to which all of nature operates in a space of reasons. “The wind blows because . . .” and the “The tree grows because . . .” are completed, within the original image, by reasons. In other words, our pre-Jonesian ancestors spoke of all natural beings in personal terms, e.g., the wind and trees are persons.10 It would have made sense to Jones’ grandfather to ask the Wind as to why it blew his house down, just as Tom Bombadil reasoned with a tree to release rude and hapless hobbits in Tolkein’s tale. Categories that have ubiquitous application are trivialities, not categories. Thus, it is not until a category has a contrasting category (a relation of “determinate negation” as Hegel famously puts it) that it has significant explanatory-cognitive value. Thus, when Jones, through empirical refinement, discovers the exclusive correlation between certain human activities (the language game of demanding and offering reasons) and persons, “it was a categorical change” (PSIM, p. 10). That is, Jones makes the category of person explicit by seeing persons (now exclusively humans) in contrast to the rest of nature. The notion of person was there in the background originally, but now it is drawn out and significantly applied. Jones’ “theory” explains by classification (as opposed to postulation); it is a discovery of a fundamentally different kind of things, persons as reasons-givers in contrast to all the rest.
Sellars pulls a lot of these strands together as follows:
I am now in a position to explain what I mean when I say that the primary objects of the manifest image are persons. I mean that it is the modification of an image in which all the objects are capable of the full range of personal activity, the modification consisting of a gradual pruning of the implications of saying with respect to what we would call an inanimate object, that it did something. Thus, in the original image to say of the wind that it blew down one's house would imply that the wind either decided to do so with an end in view, and might, perhaps, have been persuaded not to do it, or that it acted thoughtlessly (either from habit or impulse), or, perhaps, inadvertently, in which case other appropriate action on one's part might have awakened it to the enormity of what it was about to do.(PSIM, pp. 12-13; Sellars’ emphasis)
In the original image, all objects had “the full range” of personal activity, but Jones, in developing the manifest image, now categorically reserves that complete menu of cognitive powers to human beings. Jones’ scientific (correlational/categorial) innovation is the manifest image, because only with the limitation of the richest concept of person to human beings do we discover ourselves as “man-in-the-world.” Again, conceptual explicitness (cognitive significance) only occurs within a relation of determinate negation; we understand “here” and “there” only in mutual contrast, to take Hegel’s famous example. Jones, nevertheless, does not come to see nature as utterly depersonalized:
In the early stages of the development of the manifest image, the wind was no longer conceived as acting deliberately, with an end in view- but rather from habit or impulse. Nature became the locus of 'truncated persons'; that which things could be expected to do, its habits; that which exhibits no order, its impulses. Inanimate things no longer 'did' things in the sense in which persons do them-not, however, because a new category of impersonal things and impersonal processes has been achieved, but because the category of person is now applied to these things in a pruned or truncated form. (PSIM, p. 13)
The determinate negation obtaining between cognitively significant concepts is not pure negativity; “here” and “there” denote more than merely not-there or not-here respectively, but tell us where something thing. “Here” and “there” are positive determinations (modes of being) of “place.” Thus, what Jone’s discovers is not personhood as the bald contrast to the non-personal, but the contrasting categories of the fully personal and the quasi-personal; species of a common genus. Humans are personal as reasons-givers (those able to offer explicit, self-conscious justifications for their sayings and doings), whereas the rest of nature is inhabited by semi-personal agents acting out of a sort of habit or the occasional impulse, without the ability to make the reasons for these habits explicit. Thus, the manifest image is an enchanted view of nature, though in a refined way compared to the animism of the original image. The manifest image takes the world in a teleological, meaningful way; things act for reasons, and this is what is meant to say that the doings of nature are caused as opposed to merely predictable, a distinction Sellars claims is obscured by the development of modern science (PSIM, p. 14).11 Nature, acting out of habit (or out of impulse when something unexpected happens) is no less cognitively oriented than a human agent acting out of character (or "freely" in a case that requires a novel decision or in cases of lapsed judgment).12 The difference is that, whereas the former cannot be called into the space of reasons to explain its doings, the latter can. Of course, as the manifest image develops in the philosophical tradition, the cognitive standing of the non-human is further pruned, but “for philosophical purposes” (PSIM, p. 13), a sense of the original enchantment remains — nature is meaningful, without knowing its own meaning.13 Those who insist on the autonomy or even the primacy of the manifest image are likewise staking a claim to a meaningful world.
I believe that many dualists and other postulational anti-materialists, will be surprised to find that they are following the pattern of the countermeasure to this enchanting strand of Western thought, even while trying to fight a rearguard action against disenchantment. Like their materialist adversaries, they are (though unwittingly) operating within the scientific image, which demands an explanation for the manifest image in something unseen.14 The dualist attempts to preserve the meaning of the manifest world by postulating a meaning-bearing entity from the outside, which ultimately serves to confirm the disenchantment of nature. Whatever else can be said about dualism as scientific theory (maybe it saves the day!), it operates within the scientific (postulational) image. That may be all well and good, but it shows that there is a different and even more fundamental fault line in the philosophy of mind than the dualism-materialism divide.
Unless noted otherwise, all page reference are to the version of PSIM published in Science, Perception, and Reality.
We might say that, for Sellars, the meta-philosophical question is the metaphysical question. But that is not entirely unprecedented, e.g., see Bk. I of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
The various historically influential attempts to avoid this circularity by grounding thinking in some sort of non-thinking are the polemical targets of Sellars’ famous critique of the Myth of the Given in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” Note again Sellars’ penchant for myth and allegory, especially in terms of origins stories. As we shall see, the trope of diachronic origins does a lot work in the Sellarsian account of synchronic origins. Especially in light of the passage I have just quoted above (the “Special Creation” remarks), we can see that Sellars believes that the account of something’s historical coming to be offers us an important to clue to its standing and persistence as something understood in its own right.
Once again this puts us in the middle of the drama of German Idealism. Whether or not the circularity of thinking about thinking is something that can be overcome, or whether we are fated to a bottomless recursion of accounts of ourselves as always incomplete creatures, has been the primary question in German philosophy since Kant attempted to complete his system in the Third Critique. For a case that the circularity cannot be brought to the end, but that this is not inconsistent with a workable realism, see Markus Gabriel’s Why the World Does Not Exist. I argue from a similar stance in Thinking About Thinking: Mind and Meaning in the Era of Technological Nihilism (forthcoming).
Some readers may point out that I am reading Sellars under Brandom’s influence, and that is not entirely uncontroversial. Both claims are correct. For Brandom’s own critical treatment of Sellars, see his From Empiricism to Expressivism. For a very helpful presentation of the internecine controversy within the Pittsburg School (Sellars’ legacy through McDowell and Brandom), see Chauncy Maher’s The Pittsburg School of Philosophy: Sellars, McDowell, Brandom.
And here I am playing on Sellars’ famous “Myth of Jones and the Rylean Community” from “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.”
Sellars himself seems open to the possibility that much of this will need to be solved empirically. For an example of a comparative psychologist with a Sellarsian story to tell about the development of the space of reasons (both synchronically and diachronically), see M. Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking.
This is a lesson that I failed to learn from the Sellarsian training of my youth. See Madden, Mind, Matter, and Nature: A Thomistic Proposal for the Philosophy of Mind.
I want to be very careful here, since Sellars elsewhere goes out of his way to say (in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”) that Jones’ initially (at the stage of the manifest image) has no theory at all, but later (at the stage of a nascent scientific image) develops a postulational theory of inner episodes to make sense of reason-giving behavior.
As always with Sellars, remember that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” The original image is the mythological stance of our ancestors and the magical world of our own childhood.
Think here of Aristotle’s inclusion of the final cause (the end), which is an irreducibly cognitive notion, in any complete natural explanation in the Physics.
Consider how Aristotle, once again in the Physics, accounts for chance events (seemingly “uncaused” happenings, lacking teleological explanation) in terms of broader states of affairs that are explained in terms of final causes.
We might then see Aristotelian theism as a last stand of the fully personal understanding of nature in the original image. In Aristotle’s account, there are divine personal agencies (e.g., the planets) that can be called to account for the doings of nature, and the god can give reasons for the whole show (or maybe the god is the reason that can be given for the whole, since Aristotle’s prime mover definitely does not answer requests to explain itself). Later, after further pruning in the scholastic tradition, God can still provide a space of reasons explanation for all non-human natural happenings, which was by then taken as cognitively devoid. This is basically what is going on in Aquinas’ Fifth Way. Notice, however, these pruning movements are in the direction of the overall disenchantment of nature. I don’t claim that these ideas (held mostly by philosophers within the confines of universities) are what is moving the disenchantment of nature as a cultural/historical phenomenon. We philosophers are more likely expressions of our times than we are agents of history.
The materialist and the dualist are locked in a master-slave dialectic a la Hegel that defines both views contrastively, but within the shared background of the disenchantment of nature.